

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

The court has considered the report and recommendation of the  
United States Magistrate Judge (#39) filed on May 30, 2012, in  
which the magistrate judge recommends that this court grant  
defendants' motion to dismiss (#18) and deny plaintiff's cross-  
motion for summary judgment (#30). Plaintiff opposed the motion to  
dismiss (#31), and defendants replied (#33). Plaintiff has filed  
objections to the report and recommendation (#40), and defendants  
have filed their response (#41).<sup>1</sup>

24       <sup>1</sup> On July 9, 2012, plaintiff also filed a reply to the defendants'  
25 response to plaintiff's objections. Such a reply is not authorized under  
26 the court's local rules. See L.R. IB 3-2(a). Further, the reply merely  
repeats arguments the plaintiff has already asserted in earlier briefs.  
Accordingly, the court will not consider the plaintiff's unauthorized reply  
(#42).

1 The court has considered the pleadings and memoranda of the  
2 parties and other relevant matters of record and has made a review  
3 and determination in accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C.  
4 § 636 and applicable case law, the court hereby accepts and adopts  
5 the report and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge  
6 (#39). In response to the plaintiff's objections, the court notes  
7 the following.

8 Plaintiff has not disputed that the complaint filed in this  
9 action raises claims that were or could have been raised in case  
10 number 3:09-cv-000348-RCJ-VPC ("Steve I"). Rather, plaintiff has  
11 objected only to the conclusion that the dismissal of *Steve I* was  
12 with prejudice.

13 The court dismissed *Steve I* for failure to comply with a court  
14 order. The dismissal was not voluntary. Accordingly, *Steve I* was  
15 dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), and  
16 unless the court indicated otherwise or one of the listed  
17 exceptions applied, the dismissal "operate[d] as an adjudication on  
18 the merits." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). "[A]n adjudication on the  
19 merits" means, under the rule, a dismissal with prejudice. *Semtek*  
20 *Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.*, 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001); see  
21 also *Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp*, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). A  
22 dismissal with prejudice bars refiling of the same claim in the  
23 same court. *Semtek*, 531 U.S. at 506.

24 An involuntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the  
25 merits unless the dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction, improper  
26 venue, or failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil  
Procedure 19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). *Steve I* was not dismissed  
for improper venue or failure to join a party under Rule 19.

Plaintiff apparently argues, however, that it was dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, he argues: (1) that he did not submit a complaint with his *in forma pauperis* ("IFP") application so no civil action was ever initiated; and (2) the complaint he did submit was never screened and served on the defendants so the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed.

Plaintiff provides no legal authority for either of these propositions, and the court can find none. In fact, an action is "brought" for certain PLRA<sup>2</sup> purposes when the plaintiff submits an IFP application and a complaint. *O'Neal v. Price*, 531 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008); *Vaden v. Summerhill*, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff here did both. In light of this authority, there is no basis for concluding that even though an action was "brought" for certain PLRA purposes that it was not "initiated" for jurisdictional and *res judicata* purposes. In addition, there is no authority supporting plaintiff's contention that the court does not have jurisdiction over a prisoner action until screening and service have taken place.

Plaintiff also argues that his complaint was dismissed based on an "administrative issue" and not on the merits, so *res judicata* cannot apply. This argument is beside the point. An involuntary dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41 bars the plaintiff from refiling the same claim in the same court. *Semtek*, 531 U.S. at 506.

Finally, plaintiff argues that he did not receive the court's order in *Steve I* directing him to respond until after the case had

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<sup>2</sup> PLRA stands for the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 110 Stat. 1321-71, which applies to plaintiff's complaints.

been dismissed. This argument is not properly before the court in this case and was an issue only for the court in *Steve I*. In fact, 1 plaintiff did assert this argument in his motion to reopen the 2 case. When the court denied the motion, plaintiff's remedy was to 3 file a notice of appeal, not to file a new action. Plaintiff chose 4 not to exercise his valid appellate rights. The decision in *Steve* 5 *I* is final and precludes the filing of the complaint in this case.

6 In accordance with the foregoing, the defendants' motion to 7 dismiss (#18) is hereby **GRANTED** and this action is **DISMISSED WITH** 8 **PREJUDICE**. The plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment (#30) 9 is **DENIED**.

10 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

11 DATED: This 26th day of July, 2012.

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13 Howard D. McRae  
14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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